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ace of it, the tension between alternative questions and try to articulate why it is important for
- resolution and the rule of law seems practitioners, program managers, scholars, judges, and
promulgated through a process of one-party rule, but it
still maintains a rule of law system in that all people, and
the government, are expected to comply with the nation's
constitution and other laws. This is sometimes pejora-
tively called "rule by law" rather than "rule of law."2
From this thin understanding, the definition of
the rule of law can become progressively thicker by
engrafting onto it attributes that pertain to the rule of
law. Law and order is a common example, as is judicial
administration, and, at its thickest, human rights. The
idea behind these thicker versions is that the rule of law
is not merely procedural, but rather that it also embodies
certain substantive ideals. When nations don't demon-
strate these ideals in practice-for example, in assuring
the protection of human rights-proponents of the
thicker version of the rule of law may contend that the
offending country isn't following the rule of law.
Given the wide range of interpretations that can be
seen along this continuum of thickness, it is not surpris-
ing that rule of law can provide a canopy for a strange
set of bedfellows. For example, political conservatives,
even libertarians, can promote the rule of law as a neces-
sary predicate for viable capitalist economic markets.
At the same time, political liberals can use the rule of
law as a vehicle to advance equality and human rights
concerns. For this reason, the rule of law has been a
hallmark of U.S. international policy since at least the
1990s, with its meaning and emphasis shifting with dif-
ferent administrations.
How Does ADR Fit in?
Although U.S. policy on the rule of law has at times
focused on a thicker understanding of the term, develop-
ment dollars have tended to follow the thinner defini-
tion. As result, funding by the World Bank, U.S. Aid to
International Development, and others has most commonly
been directed at establishing the traditional institutions
of law. Building, repairing, and equipping courthouses has
been a mainstay of this effort, as have been efforts to design
legal systems, train judges and lawyers, and develop bar
associations. Funding has also been used to further legal
reform, especially the drafting of constitutions and codes of
contract, property, and criminal law.
Interestingly, ADR has ometimes been included as
a part of this development work. As here in the United
States, ADR has been incorporated into court programs,
for example, in India and the Dominican Republic. It
has also been employed outside the court to addre
community conflict. But also as here, much more can be
done to institutionalize ADR as a part of the legal regimes
of these developing nations. Though the domestic U.S.
experience suggests that it makes sense to begin the insti-
tutionalization process within courthouses, it also points
to the~ important potential of private sector ADR to
addres legal disputes earlier, before diey even get to the
courthouse doors Similarly, the use of ADR methods for
civic engagement of community problems can facilitate
constructive community conflict resolution, mitigate
related private conflict, and promote the social capital
that is necessary for effective democratic rule.
Undermining the Rule of Law
Yet, even under a thinner definition of the rule of law,
such progress arguably comes at a cost that harkens
back to some of the more fundamental critiques that
the modern ADR movement in the United States has
endured. In his famous ADR critique, Against Settlement,
for example, Owen Fiss expressed concerns in particular
about power imbalances, authoritative consent, and the
sometimes necessary continuing role of courts in the
administration of law.
This Fissian view, at bottom, reflects traditional
rule of law values, beginning with the assumption that
public rules represent some kind of desirable democratic
consensus on behavioral standards, and that the enforce-
ment of those standards is necessary to order human
affairs in a society in which people are inherently
unequal. Under this view, ADR is simply and fundamen-
tally incompatible with the rule of law because it denies
the application of properly derived legal standards,
resulting in outcomes that might be far removed from
what society (acting through law) has determined would
be appropriate under these circumtances. As a result, in
this strong view, any increase in the use of ADR results
in a decrease in the force or quality of the rule of law.
David Luban stresses a different aspect of the prob-
lem: the loss of judicial decisions interpreting public law
to guide societal behavior as a result of ADR.4 The core
of this argument is that ADR undermines the rule of
law by depriving the public of opinions that will clarify
and provide practical meaning of legislative acts that are
often ambiguous.
Marc Galanter's empirical research on the "vanishing
trial" certainly attests to the kind of paucity of judicial
pronouncements that Luban and Fiss would see as
necessary for a properly functioning rule of law regime.
Indeed, it suggests that American dispute resolution-
long a beacon for the rest of the world-may well be
entering an ironic era in which the vast majority of legal
disputes are resolved lawlessly, in direct contradiction to
the rule of law.
Laura Nader, Ugo Mattei, and other press the point
further and more bluntly, arguing that ADR promotes
simply harmony and results in the subordination of
lcgal rights, particularly those of society's less powerful."
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Although their vague "interests" may be satisfied in
ADR, it is often at the sacrifice of more concrete legal
entitlements that may properly be secured through the
adjudication of adversarial positions. In this way, ADR
serves not only to frustrate the rule of law by lenying its
application, but, worse yet, it ultimately uses law to rein-
force the very clas and power disparities that so often
give rise to conflict in the first place.
These critiques raise serious questions that have never
been fully resolved by the modern domestic ADR move-
ment, which has had the luxury of emerging against
a backdrop of a strong rule of law. Simply breezing by
these issues is much more troublesome in societies in
which the rule of law has yet to take root, where there
is affirmative distrust of the rule of law, and where graft,
corruption, and violence are deeply embedded instead.
In such situations, it seems rather quizzical to include
ADR in programs that seek to cultivate and institution-
alize the rule of law.
Promoting the Rule of Law
But in my view, the relationship between ADR and the
rule of law is more paradox than enigma in that a closer
look reveals a substantial capacity for ADR to promote
the rule of law.
Some benefits are fairly obviousand may be realily
drawn from our own domestic experience. For example,
ADR can serve the goals of judicial efficiency by prop-
erly diverting away from the bench cases that do not
require judicial resolution, such as ones that involve
small stakes or apply clearly defined law. By removing
such cases from the docket, ADR serves the rule of law
by allowing the courts to focus on those cases and issues
that do require judicial attention, such as cases neces-
sary to interpret constitutions or statutes or otherwise
establish precedent to guide future behavior. Reasonable
minds, of course, can differ on where to draw the line
between cases that courts should and should not decide,
but from a rule of law perspective it seems clear that
ADR can perform this function.
ADR can also promote the rule of law by allowing for
the resolution of disputes in a way that is more cultur
ally appropriate to the community in which the dispute
takes place. The South African diamond industry has
long used arlbitration to resolve its disputes, mediation-
like processes are ofren used to resolve conflict in more
c llectivist cultures acs the globe, and there i little
teason to interfere with such practices by imposing the
rule of law. This is addition by subtraction, ina sense, in
that ADR can foster the rule of law by limiting its appli-
cation to situations in which it is really necessary.
But there are other, more subtle (and arguably more
substantial) ways that ADR can promote the rule of law,
such as by fostering compliance with the rule of law and
confidence in the rule of lawya a viable alternative to
raft, corruption, and iolence
Above all else, the rule of law requires a willingness
to abide by the rules that have been cast. Moreover, it
is crucial that this compliance be voluntary-something
people are willing to do on their own-because com-
pelled enforcement of all rules is, of course, impossible
for any society as a practical matter.
The procedural justice literature tells us that there is
a vital relationship between voluntary rule compliance
and the process by which those rules are promulgated
and enforced. In particular, the literature suggests that
rule compliance is more a function of the process of rule
creation and enforcement than it is based upon one's sub-
stantive belief in the correctness of the rule. In addition,
it tells us that our perception of that process is shaped by
a number of factors, including voice (or participation),
neutrality, equality, digniTy, and trust. When we perceive
such values to be fulfilled in the course of rule promulga
tion and administration, the research suggests, we are
mtore likely to comply with the rule. When they are not,
we are less likely to comply with the rule voluntarily.
This research has important implications for the
relationship between ADR and the rule of law, both
with respect to how laws are made-that is, the creation
of the rule of law-and how disputes arising under those
laws are resolved.
With respect to law-making, it tell us that the more
rule-making processes incorporate procedural justice val-
ues, the more likely that those who are subject to the rule
will be likely to complv with it voluntarily, thus reducing
the costs of enforcing the law and increasing its legitima-
cy. We see just such results with negotiated rule-making,
for example, where government agencies and interested
parties come together to establish regulatory policies
from the bottom up rather than a top-down process of
rule-making by government fiat. Other civic engagement
processes that provide for community participation and
buy-in, such as town halls and study circles, see similar
benefits in terms of compliance and legitimacy.
With respect to dispute resolution, the research sug-
gests that procedural values should also be embedded in
the processes by which disputes arising under the law are
resolved. For the mainstay of the rule of law-traditiona
governmental adjudication-these procedural value
may provide a concree way to measure whether court
are actng i ways that promote or frustrate the rule
of law. If courts eschew voice and dignity in the haste
to process cases for example, the reseatch suggests the
result is likely to be less compliance and legitimacy, to
the likely detriment of the rule of law as a whole.
But as the dispute resolution field well knows,
traditional governmental adjudication is only one form
of dispute resolution, and the law rarely requires its
employment. Despire the concern s ratsed by alternative
processes,u uing alternative forms of dispure resolution
that are permitted by taw is not inherently inconsistent
with the rule of law. To the contrary, when the law
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permits or at least does not preclude the use of alterna-
tive means of resolving disputes, then its use can only be
seen as compatible with the rule of law,. Doing what the
law permits is the essence of the very freedom that the
rule of law in part strives to secure.
How, Not Whether
In my view, it is not the mere use of ADR that threatens
the rule of law. Rather, the danger lies in how ADR is
implemented because even nonlegal processes like ADR
are still inextricably tied to the rule of law. Statutes and
court and administrative rules in the United States,
for example, authorize the use of mediation in judicial
and administrative programs. Contract law permits the
enforcement of mediated settlement agreements, and law
helps to ensure the integrity of the process by providing
rules to protect the confidentiality of mediation com-
munications. Arbitration, too, relies on law to enforce
agreements to arbitrate as well as final arbitral awards,
and depends on courts to decide the many questions that
arise under the law of arbitration.
Naturally, how these ADR processes are conducted
will reflect on the rule of law that provides their critical
support, much as the actions of a child reflect on the
parent or the conduct of an employee reflects on her
company. When a dispute resolution process is endorsed,
authorized, or compelled by the rule of law; when it is
facilitated by the rule of law; and, finally, when it is
enforced by the rule of law, the capacity exists for the
perception of the process to influence the perception of
the rule of law that supports it. If the process is good,
then its use will redound to the benefit of the rule of
law both in perception and in practice, by expanding
the number and nature of processes available to resolve
disputes that will be supported by the rule of law. If
the process is flawed, however, then its use will reflect
negatively on the rule of law that supports it, as well as,
of course, the process itself.
Again, procedural justice values remain instructive
as a touchstone for balancing the tension between ADR
and the rule of law. When an ADR process that is sup-
ported by the rule of law comports with those values,
then it seems plausible to suggest that the process will
refietr well on, or enhance, the nule of law by furthering
the twin goals of compliance and legitimacy. On the
other hand, ADR processes that do not honor procedural
values are similarly likely to undermine the rule of law
by subverting compliance and legitimacy.
It is one thing to suggest that, when guided b proce-
dural jusrte values ADR can strengthen the rule of law
by providing more staresanctioned dispure resolution
processes that will relieve the courts of unnecessary
cases, will provide the
parties with morel0
suitable and satisfy-





the rule of law. ItPOf
is quite another to
make all of this hap-
pen in practice.
How to do that is the
type of question arising our
of this relationship that practi-
tioners and scholars alike must address,
and with some urgency considering development work is
proceeding in real time. In this issue of Dispute Resolution
Magazine, we approach the problem from several dif-
ferent perspectives. Michael Moffitt rounds out the
readings by describing the relationship between ADR
and the rule of law as a symbiotic one in which both
need each other to thrive, while Wayne Brazil reminds
us why it is more important than ever to grapple with
the tension between rights and resolution. Bill Davis,
Razili Datta, and Sergio Zegarra of DPK Consulting
give us a similar window into its use in rule-of-law pro-
grams sponsored by the U.S. Agency for International
Development. James McGuire similarly writes about how
mediation is being incorporated into the Chinese legal
system. Israeli law professor Michal Alberstein describes
how ADR has been used to help facilitate democratic
transitions in previously authoritarian regimes, such as
South Africa. And Former American Bar Association
President Robert Grey describes how ADR has been
included in some of the ABA's rule-of-law initiatives
on the ground in developing nations. Together, these
articles engage many questions raised by the relationship
between ADR and the rule of law-questions that com-
pel even ADR professionals to think outside the box.
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